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RENEGOTIATING THE BARGAIN: AN ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES FOR REVISING THE
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION IN MARYLAND'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Andrea Giampetro-Meyert
Ann M. Balcerzakt
Legal challenges to the exclusive remedy provision! of Maryland's
Workers' Compensation Ace have burgeoned in recent years. 3 These
challenges are not surprising given the increasing tension between the
workers' compensation and tort systems. 4 Additionally, the employeremployee bargain upon which the original statutes were based is
outdated. 5 Workers' compensation statutes were created to provide
workers with the certainty of some recovery for injuries suffered
incidental to an increasingly industrialized workplace. 6 In exchange,
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Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland. B.S.B.A., Bowling Green State University; J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
Partner, Balcerzak & Bartiett, Columbia, Maryland. B.A., M.S.W., Marywood
College; J.D., Catholic University of America.
See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. §§ 9-101 to 9-1201 (1991) [formerly MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, §§ 1 to 102 (1985»).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 503
A.2d 708 (1986); Le v. Federated Dep't Stores, 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42
(1989), afl'd, 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991); Continental Casualty Co. v.
Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387,449 A.2d 1176 (1982); Schatz v. York Steak House
Sys., Inc., 51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982).
When legislators originally enacted workers' compensation statutes, they did
so in the context of a legal environment that made it difficult for plaintiffs to
prevail under tort law. Today, it is easier for plaintiffs to prevail under tort
law. It is both easier for plaintiffs to prove negligence and more difficult for
defendants to prove common law defenses to liability. See Note, Exceptions
to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes,
96 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1644-45 (1983) [hereinafter Exceptions).
See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1644-45; see also Roger Snell, Comment, The
Exclusive Remedy Provision of Michigan's Workers'Disability Compensation
Act 63 U. DET. L. REv. 453 (1986). The author states that
[i)ronically, the shift in tort law has caused the employer and employee
to alter their positions. The employers who once felt that the act was
unfair are presentiy its strongest advocates, while workers, who at
first hailed the act as a blessing, today attempt to circumvent it in
order to maximize their recoveries.
[d. at 455-56.
See Deborah A. Ballam, The Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Doctrine: A
Threat to Workers' Rights Under State Employment Discrimination Statutes,
27 AM. Bus. L.J. 95, 113 (1989).
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employees gave up the right to pursue common law recovery against
their employers. 7
A variety of factors have triggered doubts about the judiciousness
of the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule. The failure of
federal 8 and state9 agencies to effectively regulate workplace safety,
the shift in our society from industrial to service oriented jobs,1O and
the decline of unionism and its consequence of fewer safety watchdogs
in the workplace ll have all contributed to the current climate questioning the exclusive remedy rule.
Employees have questioned the exclusive remedy rule after seeing
courts twist the rule to encompass causes of action under the workers'
compensation system that most would not consider normal incidents
of employment. Employees raped by their supervisors,12 rendered
sterile or impotent as a result of poor workplace safety, 13 grossly
disfigured as a result of workplace accidents,14 or working, with their
employers knowledge, in manifestly unsafe working environments IS
are encountering courts which refuse to stray from the original
bargain upon which workers' compensation statutes were created.
Workers in these, and many more situations, are being held to their
end of the bargain, thus denying them the possibility of common
law recovery. 16

7.- RICHARD P. GILBERT & ROBERT L. HUMPHREYS, JR., MARYLAND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 282 (1988) [hereinafter MARYLAND HANDBOOK].
8. See generally Holly Metz, Death by Oversight, 17 STUDENT LAW. 12 (1988)
("Because OSHA fails to protect workers, local D.A.'s are hauling employers
into criminal court.").
9. See generally WORK INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN MARYLAND (H. Epstein ed.
1977) [hereinafter WORK INJURIES IN MARYLAND].
10. See Larry T. Adams, Changing Employment Patterns 0/ Organized Workers,
108 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 25 (Feb. 1985).
11. Id.

12. See Schatz v. York Steak House Sys., Inc., 51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045
(1982); see also Rathbun v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys, 377 N.W.2d 872
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C.),
eert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
13. See Jack Dittoe, Note, The Treatment 0/ Sexual Impairment Injuries Under
Workers' Compensation Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1207, 1223, 1230 (1979).
14. Nine states do not allow benefits for disfigurement. Twenty-eight other states
limit benefits to injuries that affect employability. Exceptions, supra note 4,
at 1643 n.12. Maryland does allow compensation for disfigurement even when
earning capacity has not been affected. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
has stated that "a disfigurement may constitute an economic loss in the sense
of diminished power to produce, and it may be as much a part of the workman's
loss as the loss of a limb." Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v.
Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947).
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 503
-A.2d 708 (1986); see supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
16. Some commentators see the broad sweep of the exclusivity rule as distressing.
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So dissatisfied is one state, California, that it has considered
abolishing its traditional system in favor of an, innovative new approachY Most states, however, are considering only incremental
rather than fundamental changes to their systems. Some courts,
including Maryland's, are reconsidering the exclusive remedy provisions of their state's workers' compensation statutes. IS Recently, in
Federated Department Stores v. Le,19 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an exception to Maryland's exclusivity provision
permitted an employee to pursue a common law tort remedy against
his employer for an intentional tort committed upon him by a fellow
employee. 20
Federated demonstrates the court's willingness to adjust the
employer-employee bargain. This Article analyzes and evaluates alternatives, including the alternative presented in Federated, for revising Maryland's exclusive remedy provision. Also considered are
alternatives other jurisdictions have utilized in order to renegotiate
the bargain underlying the exclusive remedy rule.
Part I explains the theoretical underpinnings of workers' compensation statutes and their exclusive remedy provisions. Part II
examines the primary exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule in
Maryland prior to Federated. This section focuses on the intentional
tort exception in Maryland and the new interpretation of this excepSee generally Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1656 (implying that workers are
being "increasingly disadvantaged by a deal originally designed for their
benefit").
Other commentators see this broad application of the exclusive remedy
rule as necessary. See Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's
Workers' Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REv.
405, 411-16 (1988). King stresses several reasons that support a broadly based
exclusive remedy principle. "First, subjecting employers to an increased threat
of tort liability would undermine the carefully crafted compromise represented
by the workers' compensation system." [d. at 411. "Second, the transaction
costs of resolving workers' compensation cases are much less than for their
tort counterparts." [d. at 412. Third, it would be oppressive to subject
employers to both workers' compensation and tort liability claims. [d. at 41213. "Fourth, erosion of the exclusive remedy rule undermines the predictability
of the workers' compensation system." [d. at 413. Fifth, the author is concerned
about additional costs of litigating the threshold issue whether the exclusive
remedy rule applies. [d. at 413.
17. See infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
18. Courts' present willingness to reconsider the exclusive remedy provisions of
workers' compensation statutes is consistent with an earlier willingness to extend
strict products liability theory beyond consumer products to ~rkplace products, thereby allowing workers to sue third party manufacturers of defective
products. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1652.
19. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991). This decision affirmed the court of special
appeals' decision, but used different reasoning.
20. [d.
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tion articulated by the court of appeals in Federated. Also explored
are the meaning of "intent," the theory of alter ego in Maryland,
and the common law concept of vicarious liability.
Part III considers why courts and some state legislatures seem
increasingly sympathetic to employee's arguments aimed at limiting
the effects of the exclusive remedy rule. This section then explores
Federated Department Stores v. Le in detail, including a comparison
of the method by which the Court of Appeals of Maryland carved
an exception to the exclusive remedy provision to methods other
courts have utilized. This section clarifies the judicial alternatives for
renegotiating the workers' compensation bargain. Finally, Part III
considers legislative action that might be appropriate, summarizing
the possible approaches Maryland could adopt in revising its workers'
compensation law.
Part IV outlines and evaluates the five major alternatives available to Maryland. This section also assesses the feasibility of each
alternative in the context of a state legislature that is less than
enthusiastic about renegotiating a bargain that would in any way
provide more benefits to employees thereby raising employers' costS.21
The Article concludes that Maryland should move toward protecting
employees from unsafe work environments by adjusting the delicate
balance between employer and employee rights. Maryland's courts
and legislature should make this adjustment, but with full understanding of the implications of each of several alternatives.
I.

BACKGROUND

In the nineteenth century, employees injured on the job could
sue their employers at common law, but they typically lost.22 Courts
required employees to prove fault on the employer's part, which was
difficult. 23 Those employees who were able to prove their employer's

21. The issue of whether the legislature or the courts should renegotiate the bargain
is important. Some courts believe that since the bargain was designed by the
legislature, that they should not tamper with it. Exceptions, supra note 4, at
1654 (citing, e.g., Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del.
1982}). Other courts believe they have an essential role in interpreting the limits.
of the exclusive remedy rule. See Le v. Federated Dep't Stores, 80 Md. App.
89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989), a/I'd, 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991). Judicial
action is important because legislatures tend to be slow. Additionally, politicians
may be reluctant to make decisions that would benefit employees and thereby
drive em~loyers to other states.
22. Before st~tes adopted workers' compensation laws, approximately eighty percent
of injured employees lost their cases against the employer for work-related
injuries. See Snell, supra note 5, at 453 (citing S. HOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS
IN BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 469 (1947».
23. See Snell, supra note 5, at 453.
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negligence still frequently lost because the employers were able to
prove one of three available defenses - assumption of risk, contributory negligence and the fellow-servant rule.24 Employees who prevailed in spite of the obstacles often enjoyed sparse awards because
medical bills, attorney fees and other expenses were deducted therefrom.2s
The industrial revolution brought with it an increased number
of workers injured or killed on the job.26 Faced with workers who
could not work to full capacity, and dependents of those workers
needing financial support,27 states began to consider adopting workers' compensation laws.28
States considering workers' compensation laws keenly examined
approaches adopted by European legislatures in the late nineteenth
century. American lawmakers paid particular attention to British and
German approaches to workers' compensation, determining that the
statutes adopted by those countries effectively promoted safety without compromising industrial progress. 29
Maryland became the first state in the nation to adopt a workers'
compensation program when, in 1902, its legislature established an
. "Employers and Employees Cooperative Insurance Fund."30 The
fund benefitted employees, but it was both complicated and limited
in coverage.3l By 1911, twenty-five states had enacted workers' compensation statutes,32 offering employees an alternative to the problematic avenue of pursuing common law remedies for injuries.
Today, workers' compensation laws throughout the United States
vary regarding specific provisions,33 but consistently promote two
24. See id. Because these common law theories typically precluded recovery against
the employer, the employee's legal recovery was usually limited to proceeding
against a co-worker who may have caused the accident. Co-workers typically
had little money, so as a practical matter injured employees had no remedy
available to them.
25. [d.; see MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 2-3.
26. See MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 14.
27. See id.
28. [d. Alternatives to workers' compensation existed: injured workers could become beggars or states could have provided welfare to injured employees and
their dependents. [d. at 14-15.
29. See id. at .15-16.
30. [d. at 16.
31. [d. The Act benefitted employees who worked in private transportation, quarry
and mining operations, and municipal or private construction contract work.
The law was repealed in less than two years because of the nominal amount
of its coverage, its application to only death cases, and its inherent complexity.
[d.

32. [d.
33. See generally COMPENDIUM ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION (Nat'l Comm'n on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws ed., 1973); U.S. ClIAMBER OF COMMERCE,
ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 1982 (1982).
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primary goals. First, workers' compensation statutes aim to benefit
employees accidently injured on the job by providing immediate
compensation for lost wages, medical expenses, and rehabilitation
services without requiring employees to prove employer fault. 34 Second, the statutes aim to benefit employers by providing them with
immunity from negligence-based civil lawsuits. 35 This delicate balance
between employer and employee rights is reflected in a key provision
in every workers' compensation statute - the exclusive remedy
provision.
The exclusive remedy principle in workers' compensation legislation provides that an employee's only remedy for injuries suffered
on the job is through the workers' compensation system. 36 Injured
employees may not pursue civil claims against their employersY
34. See, e.g., Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 412 A.2d 733 (1980); BethlehemSparrows Point Shipyard v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 50 A.2d 799 (1947).
35. See, e.g., Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 520 A.2d 717 (1987);
Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 631, 519 A.2d 743 (1987), rev'd,
324 Md. 617, 552 A.2d 889 (1989); Wood v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 260
Md. 651, 273 A.2d 125 (1971).
36. Ballam, supra note 6, at 96 n.2. Maryland's exclusive remedy provision outlines
duties of employees and specifies those injuries not included. MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(a) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15
(1985»). Section 9-501 of the Act details the scope of coverage:
(a) In general.-Except as otherwise provided, each employer of a
covered employee shall provide compensation in accordance with this
title to:
(1) the covered employee for an accidental personal injury sustained by the covered employee;· or
(2) the dependents of the covered employee for death of the
covered employee:
(i) resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by
the covered employee; and
(ii) occurring within 7 years after the date of the accidental
personal injury.
(b) Employer liable regardless oj jault.-An employer is liable to
provide compensation in accordance with subsection (a) of this section,
regardless of fault as to a cause of the accidental personal injury.
Id. § 9-501.
Section 9-509 sets out the exclusiveness of remedy:
(a) Employers.-Except as otherwise provided in this title, the liability
of an employer under this title is exclusive.
(b) Covered employees and dependents.-Except as otherwise provided
in this title, the compensation provided under this title to a covered
employee or the dependents of a covered employee is in place of any
right of action against any person.
Id. § 9-509(a).
37. See, e.g., Flood v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320
(1963); Cox v. Sandler's, Inc., 209 Md. 193, 120 A.2d 674 (1956); Hart v.
Sealtest, Inc., 186 Md. 183, 46 A.2d 293 (1946); Baltimore Transit Co. v.
State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1944).
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Several courts, including Maryland's, have interpreted this exclusive
remedy provision broadly. As a result, workers have foregone the
right to sue at common law for nearly all claims, even those claims
for which no remedy is available under the workers' compensation
system. 38 Some limited exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule do
exist. The next section outlines Maryland's exceptions.
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY RULE IN
MARYLAND PRIOR TO FEDERATED DEPARTMENT
STORES v. LE
State statutes vary in the manner in which they outline exceptions
to the exclusivity principle. 39 In Maryland, the legislature has outlined
38. Ballam, supra note 6, at 108; see also Jean C. Love, Punishment and Deter-

rence: A Comparative Study oj Tort Liability Under No-Fault Compensation
Legislation, 16 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 232, 244-45 (1981); e.g., Lawrence v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 627 P.2d 1168, 1168-70 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that although the workers' compensation act does not provide compensation
for employer's wanton conduct, act nonetheless bars common law remedies
for same). See generally 2A ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.20 (1992) (discussing cases barring tort recovery for noncompensable
injuries).
39. As in Maryland, some states allow employees to sue under common law when
the employer engages in intentional, willful, or deliberate employer misconduct.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(d) (1991) provides that:
(d) If a covered employee is injured or killed as the result of the
deliberate intent of the employer to injure or kill the covered employee,
the covered employee, or, in the case of death, a surviving spouse,
child, or dependent of the covered employee may:
(1) bring a claim for compensation under this title; or
(2) bring an action for damages against the employer.
[d. § 9-509(d); see also ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A)-(C) (1983 & Supp.
1991) (willful misconduct); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b) (West 1989) (willful
physical assault); IDAHO CODE § 72-209(3) (1989) (willful or unprovoked physical
aggression); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (Baldwin 1986) (deliberate
intention); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032(B) (West Supp. 1992) (intentional
act); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:8(I)(b) (Supp. 1991) (intentional torts);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A) (Baldwin 1990) (intentional tort); OR.
REv. STAT. §.656.156(2) (1979) (deliberate intention); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978) (intentional tort); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020
(1990) (deliberate intention); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b) (Supp. 1992) (deliberate
intention).
In other states, courts have provided common law remedies to employees.
See, e.g., Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 87 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93-94
(App. Div. 1949); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 9 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1940).
Finally, some states impose additional penalties on the employer in the
form of a specified percentage increase in the employee's compensation award
when the employer's misconduct was serious or willful, or when the employer
violated safety statutes or orders. See Omo CONST. art. II, § 35 (15-50070
penalty); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989) (50% penalty); Ky. REV. STAT.
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two exceptions to this principle,40 and the courts, in turn, have
interpreted these exceptions. This section focuses on how Maryland
courts interpreted the exceptions prior to Federated Department
Stores v. Le.

A.

Failure to Provide Insurance

The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act states that liability
under the Act is exclusive unless an employer should fail to secure
the payment of compensation for injured employees and their dependents as required by the statute, in which case the employees or
their legal representatives may opt to pursue a common law remedy. 41

B.

The Intentional Tort Exception
The Act states that employees can elect to pursue common law
remedies or receive compensation under the workers' compensation
system when the employee's injury or death results from the employer's intentional act. 42 This provision of the Act has been the
focus of extensive judicial interpretation.
In Maryland, as in most states, the issue of whether an employee's injury arose out of intentional actions in the workplace is
significant. Most employees would prefer to sue in tort rather than
presenting a workers' compensation claim because of the possibility
of a greater monetary award. Under workers' compensation, recovery
is based on the goal of keeping workers from becoming burdens on
the community, as compared to the goal of tort law, which is to
restore plaintiffs to their former positions. 43 The only injuries usually
compensated under workers' compensation are those that produce

40.

41.

42.
43.

ANN. § 342.165 (Baldwin 1986) (15070 penalty); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
152, § 28 (West 1988) (100% penalty); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(4) (Vernon
Supp. 1992) (15% penalty); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10 (1978) (10% penalty);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1991) (10070 penalty); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12
(1988) (15% penalty); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West 1988) (15% penalty).
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(c), (d) (1991). Section 9-509(d) provides
an exception for intentionally inflicted injuries. Section 9-509(c) allows employees the option to accept workers' compensation or to sue under the common
law when the "employer fails to secure compensation in accordance with this
title." Id. § 9-509(c).
See id. § 9-509(c); see also Kramer v. Globe Brewing Co., 175 Md. 461, 470,
2 A.2d 634, 638 (1938) (explaining that "the right to sue the employer at
common law is only inherent . . . in those cases in which the employer has
failed to comply with [the Workmen's Compensation Act], in which latter case
the employee . . . has the option of either claiming compensation under the
Act, or maintaining an action at common law").
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(d) (1991).
Leslie H. Kawaler, Note, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation
Statutes: A Blessing or a Burden?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 181, 185 (1983).
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disability and thus affect earning power. 44 Workers' compensation
statutes typically grant the worker only one-half to two-thirds of his
or her previous salary, with a maximum weekly recovery outlined by
the state legislature. 4s The issues of what is or is not intentional
behavior, and whether the employer engaged in such behavior, are
thus important mediating factors affecting the injured employee's
potential recovery.
Some states workers' compensation statutes, including Maryland's, specifically allow common law suits against employers who
. commit intentional torts against an employee. 46 Courts in several
other states have interpreted their state statutes to allow common
law recovery for intentional acts of employers that result in injuries
to workers. 47 In the same vein, some states' statutes impose percentage
penalties on the employer for employer misconduct resulting in
additional compensation for injured employees. 48
The threshold issue of what constitutes an intentional act has
been left to judicial interpretation. Specifically, courts in Maryland
and throughout the country have focused on two major issues. First,
courts have addressed the meaning of "intent." Second, courts have
addressed the issue of whether an employer can be held responsible
for an intentional act performed by someone other than the employer,
such as a supervisor or co-employee.
1.

The Meaning of "Intent"

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted that "[eJven a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked. "49 Similarly, in the workers' compensation context, courts consider whether
employees were "stumbled over" or "kicked" by their employers.
Most courts agree that employers who engage in assault and battery
upon their employees should not benefit from the limited liability
provided under workers' compensation. Courts usually provide one
of two rationales for this conclusion. so
44.Id.
45. Id. Additionally, workers can get lump sum payments for permanent partial
disabilities, medical expenses, rehabilitation expenses, and death benefits when
necessary. The amounts required to be paid to employees and dependents are
provided in various sections of the Workers' Compensation Act. See, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-678 to 9-686 (1991) (death benefit provisions); id. §§ 9-625 to 9-632 (permanent disability provisions).
46. See supra note 39.
47.Id.
48.Id.
49. OLrvER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
50. A third, less common .rationale is that an assault does not constitute a risk of
the employment. Thus, this behavior falls outside the workers' compensation

60

[Vol. 21
The first rationale is based upon ethical considerations. 51 Courts52
and commentators 53 have provided numerous assertions similar to
the following: "[A]n employer cannot correct and punish with whips
the mistakes of his employees committed in the course of their
employment, and protect himself against civil liability for the results
of his assaults under the coverage of our Workmen's Compensation.
Baltimore Law Review

ACt."54

The second rationale for excluding intentional acts from workers'
compensation coverage is that accidents, unlike intentional acts, are
either unavoidable or occur through the employer's negligence. 55
Intentional acts, however, do not happen without foresight or expectation,56 and are not accidents. Because of this distinction, intentional torts should not be brought under the umbrella of a workers'
compensation system that was created to deal specifically with negligent injuriesY

51.

52.
53.

54.

55.
56.

57.

act. This rationale has been criticized as being incompatible with the view that
"even the most unforeseeable injuries resulting from risks which could never
have been reasonably contemplated may still be compensable if the employment
... exposed the employee to those risks." Joseph A. Page, The Exclusivity
oj the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's Right to Sue His
Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 555, 561 (1963).
Id. at 560.
See, e.g., Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 87 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (App.
Div.), cert. denied, 89 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. 1949).
See Kawaler, supra note 43, at 186. The author states that "[a] plaintiff should
not be denied the amount of compensation which a court would find adequate
simply because he was misfortunate enough to be employed by the one who
intentionally caused his injury." Id.
Page, supra note 50, at 560 (citing Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d
885, 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939»; see also SAMUEL B. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND
DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 336 (1944) ("It would be
against sound reason to allow the employer deliberately to batter his helper,
and then compel the worker to accept moderate workmen's compensation
benefits ... from his insurance carrier.").
See Thomas D. Schroeder, Note, Workers' Compensation: Expanding the
Intentional Tort Exception to Include Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Employer
Misconduct, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 890, 904 (1983).
Id. at 905.
See id. In Maryland, the issue of whether an injury arose from an "accident"
has significance for a different reason. Maryland uses the term "accident" to
limit employer liability. Maryland law provides recovery for the disability or
death of an employee resulting from accidental personal injury sustained by
the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment. MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-501(a) (1991). In other words, not all injuries arising
out of and in the course of employment are compensable. Only accidental
injuries are compensable. See, e.g., Rieger v. Washington Suburban Sanitation
Comm'n, 211 Md. 214, 126 A.2d 598 (1956) (holding pipe fitter not entitled
to compensation for injury resulting while pulling down on a wrench to tighten
bolts since position was a normal incident of the work).
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Despite strong reasons for refusing to allow employers to escape
responsibility for intentional acts, courts are reluctant to declare acts
other than direct assaults and batteries "intentional." Thus, the
plaintiff who asserts that the employer's act was intentional, thereby
exposing the employer to a common law tort suit, faces an extremely
difficult task in proving intent unless he has suffered a direct assault
or battery. Because the majority of plaintiffs who pursue this route
lose, the plaintiff's safest choice is to seek recovery under the workers'
compensation statute. 58
Some cases, such as where an employee can prove that an
employer had an actual or specific intent to injure the employee, are
clear. 59 In Maryland, for instance, it is clear that employees may
pursue common law remedies against employers who commit assaults. 60
Other cases are less clear. The threshold issue of what constitutes
the "intent" necessary to bypass the exclusive remedy provision is
the subject of intense debate. The minority position would allow
common law recovery despite absence of actual intent by the employer
For an injury to be accidental it must result from some unusual exertion
or strain or some unusual condition in the employment. See, e.g., Sargent v.
Board of Educ., 49 Md. App. 577, 433 A.2d 1209 (1981) (holding the annual
cleaning of a boiler to be an extreme departure from routine duties); WhitingTurner Contracting Co. v. McLaughlin, 11 Md. App. 360, 274 A.2d 390 (1971)
(holding that foreman's argument with a supervisor did not constitute an
unusual strain or exertion on foreman's part); Commercial Transfer Co. v.
Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967) (uprighting a 500 pound drum that
tilted back onto truck driver found to be unusual exertion or strain); see also
MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 75.
58. See Kawaler, supra note 43, at 182.
59. See, e.g., Wade v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982); Boek
v. Wong Hing, 231 N.W. 233 (Minn. 1930). See generally 2A LARSON, supra
note 38, § 68.11, at 13-14. Larson explains that courts have used different
theories to allow common law recovery in this situation. Some courts state
that assaults do not arise out of the employment relationship, thus they are
not covered by workers' compensation. Other courts state that assaults are
intentional and not accidental. Finally, some courts believe that the employment
relationship is severed momentarily when an employer assaults an employee.
Thus, the assault falls outside of the scope of workers' compensation.
60. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(d) (1991); see also Johnson v.
Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 255, 503 A.2d 708, 712
(1986) (holding that complaint should be "based on allegations of an intentional
or deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences
of the act" in order for employee to bypass the exclusivity provision of the
workers' compensation statute); see also Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 (1985) (extending intentional tort exception
to common law claims against workers' compensation insurer for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress committed on a claimant when the
complaint alleges an injury resulting from the deliberate intention of the insurer
to produce such injury).

62

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 21

to injure the employee if the "employer proceeded with a certain
course of action even though it knew, or should have known, that
harm to its employees was substantially certain to occur. "61 This
standard allows employees to pursue common law actions against
the grossly negligent or reckless employer. 62
The majority of states are more cautious and unwilling to narrow
the scope of workers' compensation. 63 Thus, most courts find an
intentional tort only when the employer had a specific or actual
intent to injure an employee. Following the majority rule, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held in Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of
Delmarva, Inc.,64 that the exclusivity rule of Maryland's Workers'
Compensation Act does not permit an employee to pursue a common
law action against an employer for accidental injuries caused by
gross, wanton, willful, or reckless negligence of the employer, except
when such injury is intentional. 65 The case, a wrongful death and
survivorship action against an employer, focused on the claim of the
mother of a deceased sixteen year old who died by electrocution
while using a sump pump to remove liquid chicken fat and water
from a ground depression. 66
The suit alleged that the employer's failure to warn of dangerous
electrical lines or to provide safe conditions effectively placed the
employee in a deliberately dangerous position.67 Additionally, the suit
alleged that the employer had willfully violated government regulations. 68 Approximately two months before the electrocution, the
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MOSHA)
had cited the company for a "serious violation,"69 focusing on several
defective and dangerous parts of the sump pump's electrical connec-

61. Ballam, supra note 6, at 112.
62. See id. Most jurisdictions have rejected this approach because they fear that
the exclusive remedy provision would become easier to avoid, thus jeopardizing
the workers' compensation system. See generally 2A LARSON, supra note 38,
§ 68.15, at 13-58.
63. See Schroeder, supra note 55, at 897.
64. 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 708 (1986).
65. [d. at 253, 503 A.2d at 711-12. This position is inconsistent with the following
assertion by a workers' compensation scholar:
An employer who knows for a fact that if certain conditions are
allowed to exist or if certain changes are put into effect, harm will
befall a particular employee or anyone of a group of employees, is
certainly not far removed, in terms of moral blameworthiness, from
the boss who "clobbers" a worker with a baseball bat.
Page, supra note 50, at 564.
66. Johnson, 305 Md. at 248, 503 A.2d at 709.
67. [d. at 255, 503 A.2d at 712.
68. [d.

69. [d. at 248, 503 A.2d at 709.

1991]

Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Provision

63

tions.70 After the citations were issued, Mountaire informed MOSHA
that it had corrected the violation when in fact it had not.71
In Johnson, the court of appeals rejected a minority rule that
broadened the "intent" definition 72 and held that the employer's
behavior did not constitute an intentional tort for the purposes of
overcoming the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act. 73 The court stated that to bypass the exclusivity provided by the
workmen's compensation statute, the complaint must allege an intentional or deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring
about the consequences of the act. 74 The court further stated that
"[a]n employer has acted with 'deliberate intention' only when the
employer has determined to injure an employee or employees within
the same class and used some means to accomplish this goal. "75
In sum, the meaning of "intent" in Maryland is reserved for
specific and rare situations. It is difficult to find a scenario outside
actual assault and battery by the employer that would qualify as
"intentional," and thus allow employees to pursue common law
remedies rather than seek the remedy provided by the workers'
compensation system. Thus, although the Act appears to give em70. [d.
71. [d.
72. The minority rule that broadened the intent definition was established by Ohio
and West Virginia courts. In Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc.,
433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982), the Supreme Court
of Ohio ruled in favor of employees who sought to avoid the exclusivity
principle when they alleged that their employer failed to warn them of the
dangers associated with toxic chemicals. The employees were successful in their
argument that this behavior was intentional, malicious, and in wanton disregard
for their health and safety.
In Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), the
Supreme Court of West Virginia ruled in favor of an employee who lost a
portion of his hand while operating a table saw. The employer had removed
a safety shielding device after a safety inspector had "tagged" the equipment
and prohibited the saw's use without the shield. The employer had allegedly
required the plaintiff to operate the saw. The court held that employees may
pursue common law actions when their employer's willful, wanton, or reckless
misconduct results in death or injury.
The legislatures of both Ohio and West Virginia overruled their courts'
decisions. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Baldwin 1990); W. VA. CODE
§ 23-4-2 (1992).
73. Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 255, 503 A.2d
708, 712 (1986).
74. [d. . Some commentators have pointed out that employers who engage in
behavior similar to the employer's conduct in Johnson are attempting to
maximize productivity, not to inflict injury. See Edward J. O'Connell, Jr.,
Note, Intentional Employer Misconduct and Pennsylvania's Exclusive Remedy
Rule After Poyser v. Newman & Co.: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 49
U. PITT. L. REv. 1127, 1146 (1988).
75. Johnson, 305 Md. at 258, 503 A.2d at 714.
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ployees the option of electing to sue civilly in the intentional tort
situation, it is rare that employees can successfully exercise this
option.

2. The Alter Ego Issue and the Employer's Liability for
Intentional Acts of Co-Workers
Where an employee incurs an injury as the result of an employers' intentional act, Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act allows
an employee to make an election as to pressing a claim under the
Act or in a common law tort suit against the employer. 76 The issue
of an employers' liability for a worker injured by the intentional act
of a co-worker is far less clear. Prior to Federated Department Stores
v. Le,77 Maryland courts interpreted the Act to allow employees to
sue their employers under the common law for intentional torts only
if the employer or someone acting as the "alter ego" of the employer
was the actual tort feasor .78
The seminal case addressing intentional acts of co-employees is
Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.,19 a 1946 case in which a worker,
Rice, was killed by a co-worker on the employer's premises for
reasons unrelated to the workplace. 80 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland framed the inquiry in Rice as whether the assault "arose
out of the course of employment. "81
Based on the evidence, the court held that the death did not
arise "out of" Rice's employment and was therefore not compensable
under workers' compensation. 82 The court identified three factors
leading to its decision: (1) the fact that the attack was not due to a
friction of personalities inseparable from the workplace; (2) the
workplace did not enhance the opportunity for revenge; and (3) the
bare fact that the workplace brought the parties together was not
enough to show a nexus between the workplace and the injury.83
In 1982 in Schatz v. York Steak House Systems, Inc.,84 the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland significantly departed from
the Rice analysis. Schatz involved a waitress who was raped by her
76. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP., § 9-509(d) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE
art. 101, § 44 (1985)].
77. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991), aff'g 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989).
78. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176
(1982) (discussed infra notes 93-101); Schatz v. York Steak House Sys., Inc.,
51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982) (discussed infra notes 84-92).
79. 186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166 (1946).
80. Id. at 566, 48 A.2d at 167.
81. Id. at 566-68, 48 A.2d at 167-69.
82.Id.
83. Id. at 568, 48 A.2d at 169.
84. 51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982).
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supervisor, an assistant manager, while assisting with preparations
for the nightly closing. 85 The employee received compensation benefits, and filed a tort action against the employer for physical and
psychological damages. 86
The court reasoned that an employer's liability for an employee's
intentional misconduct was limited to circumstances in which the
employee acted as the "alter ego" of the employer. 87 Elaborating,
the court stated that when the person who intentionally injures the
employee is not "realistically the alter ego of the corporation, but
merely a foreman, supervisor or manager," the employee is barred
from bringing a damage action against the employer. 88 The court
then found that the assistant manager was not the employer's alter
ego, effectively denying the injured employee the opportunity to
bring a common law tort action against her employer under the
workers' compensation act's intentional tort exception. 89
The court also rejected the employee's argument that since the
incident did not arise "out of and in the course of employment,"
that it was therefore not addressed by the Workers' Compensation
Act. 90 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the provision for recovery
under the Act by workers injured by third persons while in the course
of employment91 does not include fellow employees as "third persons." Without mentioning Rice, the court held that a fellow employee whose willful or negligent act caused injury to an employee
in the course of his employment could be considered a "third person"
under the Act. 92 Thus because the Act provided a basis for recovery,
the plaintiff did not have the option of pursuing a common law
remedy.
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile,93 the court of special
appeals clarified the Schatz'decision, thereby shedding more light on
the alter ego issue. Mirabile involved an employee who sued his
supervisors and employer for negligence, defamation, assault, battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy to interfere
with contractual relations. 94 These charges stemmed from "a series

85. [d. at 495, 444 A.2d at 1046.
86. [d.
87. [d. at 497, 444 A.2d at 1047.

88. Id. (quoting 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 68.21,
at 13: 10-11 (1976».
89. [d. at 497-98, 444 A.2d at 1048.
90. [d. at 497, 444 A.2d at 1047.
91. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-101(b)(2) (1992) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE
art. 101, § 67(6) (1985»).
92. Schatz, 51 Md. App. at 499, 444 A.2d at 1048.
93. 52 Md. App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176 (1982).
94. [d. at 388, 449 A.2d at 1178.
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of petty humiliations inflicted upon an extremely sensitive young
man" by his co-workers.9s
Relying on Schatz, the court held that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy as against the employer
because the supervisors were not acting as the alter ego of the
employer.96 Reaffirming that supervisors are not automatically the
employer's alter ego, the court explained that it would consider an
employee's rank, position, or status to determine whether the employee is the employer's alter ego. 97 Specifically, the court stated that
"[a]ttribution of employer liability for the actor's conduct should be
based on identification rather than agency and is appropriate only
where the actual tortfeasor is of such a rank or position that he may
be deemed the alter ego of the employer.' '98
The court stated that it would also consider whether the employer
directed or authorized the assault. 99 Upon the evidence presented, the
court decided that the tortfeasor, a claims manager, was not the
employer's alter ego, thus the Act's exclusivity provision barred the
assault and battery count against the employer .100 The court reasoned
that allowing a tort action against the employer for the intentional
torts of an employee who was not the employer's alter ego would
allow plaintiffs to recover merely by showing that the assailant was
"one notch higher on the totem-pole than the victim."lol Thus, prior
to Federated Department Stores v. Le,l02 it was extremely difficult
for an employee in Maryland to avoid the exclusive remedy provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act for intentional conduct exhibited
by someone other than the employer .103

95. Id.
96. Id. at 395-98, 449 A.2d at 1181-83.
97. Id. at 396-97, 449 A.2d at 1182.
98.Id.
99. Id. at 398, 449 A.2d at 1183.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 68.21,
at 13 (1976». Some commentators have indicated that allowing recovery outside
of workers' compensation by showing that the supervisory employee is "one
notch higher on the totem pole" would be problematic. In complex organizational structures, a foreman at the bottom of the hierarchy could subject the
employer to liability without employer awareness. Liability would be determined
by whether the tort feasor outranks the injured employee, rather than by whether
the injury was work-related. Schroeder, supra note 55, at 899 (citing 2A A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 68.21, at 13-34 (1976».
However, this position insulates corporate employers from intentional actions
brought by employees. Page, supra note 50, at 564.
102. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991); see supra notes 143-180 and accompanying
text.
103. Plaintiffs elsewhere have, on occasion, been successful. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Gusmack Restaurant Corp., 150 N.Y.S.2d 232 (City Ct. 1954) (denying defen-
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3.

Vicarious Liability
An employee able to persuade the court that the tort feasor was
the employer's alter ego, so as to permit the employee to pursue a
common law remedy, might nonetheless have great difficulty prevailing. Once the employee removes his claim from the Workers'
Compensation Act pursuant to the intentional tort exception, then
conventional tort law, 104 including the doctrine of respondeat superior, applies. lOS Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is held, regardless of fault, vicariously liable for an employee's
tortious conduct committed within the scope of the employee's job. I06
Maryland courts have outlined the showing required to prevail
in a suit sounding in respondeat superior. In Cox v. Prince George's
County,lCJ7 the court of appeals noted first that "the tortious actor
must be the servant or agent of the one sought to be held liable,
that is, a master-servant or principal-agent relationship must exist. "108
Once this is established, the plaintiff must "show that the offending
conduct occurred within the scope of employment, or under the
express or implied authorization of the master. "109

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

dant's motion to limit employee's claim to workers' compensation where
employee was assaulted by the president and operator of employer bar and
grill); Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., Inc., 230 S.W.2d 28 (Ark.
1950) (finding corporate liability triggered by an assault by a general manager).
Of course, plaintiffs can sue their co-employees directly. See, e.g., Hutzell
v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969) (allowing suit by co-employee
passenger when co-employee driver fell asleep at the wheel and truck ran off
the road). It is unlikely, however, that the co-employees have deep pockets.
Additionally, plaintiffs could base a suit against the employer upon negligent
hiring or supervision; however, as these claims are based on negligence, they
are barred by the exclusivity rule. See, e.g., La Bonte v. National Gypsum
Co., 269 A.2d 634 (N.H. 1970) (holding that exclusivity provisions of Workers'
Compensation Statute barred husband who received injuries from assault and
battery committed by co-worker from bringing suit against employer for
negligence; but allowing wife to sue for loss of consortium); Durso v. Modern
Biscuit Corp., 205 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 1960) (holding that as award by
Workmen's Compensation Board is binding determination that injuries received
from fellow employee "arose out of and in the course of the employment,"
employee's sole remedy was under Workmen's Compensation Act). See generally Ralph L. Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts of
His Servants, 45 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1, 15 (1968) (discussing negligent hiring
as alternative basis for suit).
See Donald C. Massey, Comment, Intentional Torts in Workman's Compensation Cases: Bazley v. Tortorich Revisited, 30 Loy. L. REv. 337, 357 (1984).
See Brill, supra note 103, at 1.
Id.
296 Md. 162, 460 A.2d 1038 (1983).
Id. at 165, 460 A.2d at 1039; see Brill, supra note 103, at 1; see also Drug
Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 346, 283 A.2d 392, 395 (1971).
Cox, 296 Md. at 165, 460 A.2d at 1039; see MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra
note 7, at 92-93 (citing Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 186 Md. 561, 48
A.2d 166 (1946) (death of worker did not arise "out of" employment».
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Courts have stated that a tort is committed in the scope of
employment if the underlying action is necessary to achieve the
purpose of the employment, occurs substantially within the authorized
time and space limits of the workplace, and is intended to serve the
purposes of the employer. llo Courts have also clarified the authority
issue. A master's liability extends to 'intentional torts committed by
a servant, whether or not the servant's act is authorized, if the act
is done in connection with the servant's employment and is not
unexpected in view of the servant's duties. 1Il
An employee who could successfully prove the wrongful employee was the employer's "alter ego," therefore allowing a common
law suit, would still face obstacles. For example, even if the tort feasor
was the employer's "alter ego" and acted within the scope of
employment, the act of intentionally injuring a fellow employee would
seldom serve the purposes of the employerll2 or constitute expected.
conduct in view of the duties of the servant. lI3
Thus, for example, even if the employee who was raped by her
supervisor in Schatz l14 had managed to avoid the exclusive remedy
rule, she may have nonetheless lost at common law because the
tort feasor was clearly neither serving his employer's purposes nor
acting in an expected manner. The same may have been true of the
plaintiff in Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile. lls
In sum, the intentional tort exception in Maryland has historically been narrowly interpreted. Even if an employee managed to
overcome the difficulty of avoiding the exclusive remedy provision,
he or she still faced tremendous obstacles prevailing at common law.
RENEGOTIA TING THE BARGAIN
Employees believing their injuries to be undercompensated, ll6
coupled with employers concerned over skyrocketing insurance premIII.

110. Lewis v. Accelerated Transp.-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 255-56, 148
A.2d 783, 785 (1959).
111. Cox, 296 Md. at 171, 460 A.2d at 1042 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 245).
112. See supra text accompanying note 110.
113. See supra text accompanying note 111.
114. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101. In this case, it is doubtful that the
employee's supervisor could be serving the employer or acting in an expected
way when he allowed the plaintiffs co-workers to inflict humiliations upon the
extremely sensitive plaintiff.
116. See Snell, supra note 5, at 455 ("The benefits under workers' compensation
have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. Workers also find
themselves in the position of accepting predetermined limits on the amount of
compensation they can receive for wage losses and medical expenses. The
limitations rarely permit the worker to receive the statutory maximum allowable
under the act. ").
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iums,lI7 have fueled discussions about changing the workers' compensation system. The judicial system and some state legislatures
have increasingly faced the difficult task of addressing employee
demands for relief, while maintaining the integrity of the workers'
compensation system. This section examines some indicators that
show the need to reassess the status of the workers' compensation
system in light of its purpose and intent, and explores strategies to
maintain the integrity of this system.

A.

Why Courts and Legislatures Are Reconsidering the Bargain

Courts have dealt cautiously with the workers' compensation
system because of the belief that any major readjustment should
come from the legislature. liS Despite this caution, or perhaps because
of it, judicial intervention has drawn into the workers' compensation
system some types of claims that developed in other areas of the
law. For example, some courts require state discrimination claims 1l9
that allege physical injuries to be brought under the workers' compensation system. 120
117. See Roger Thompson, Fighting the High Costo! Workers' Comp, NATION'S
Bus., Mar. 1990, at 20-28.
118. See supra note 21.
119. Federal discrimination claims could not be barred by state exclusivity law
because doing so would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d
1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
120. See Stimson v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 258 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
(finding employee who suffered a nervous breakdown and lost her capacity to
work precluded from bringing state discrimination action by the exclusivity
rule of the workers' compensation statute); see also Moll v. Parkside Livonia
Credit Union, 525 F. Supp. 786 (B.D. Mich. 1981) (finding employee who
filed sex discrimination action precluded from recovering compensatory and
punitive damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but not precluded
from recovering damages under the Equal Pay Act or from maintaining action
for mental and physical damages under the Civil Rights Act, when those mental
and physical damages did not result in disability); Schroeder v. Dayton Hudson
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (finding civil rights action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from age and sex discrimination precluded). But see Luna v. City & County of Denver, 537 F. Supp.
798 (D. Colo. 1982) (finding actions for intentional infliction of emotional
distress without accompanying physical injury cognizable under Colorado law);
Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (rejecting
the Stimson holding); Sullivan v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 79 (B.D. Wis.
1977) (finding workers' compensation statute did not include claims for injury
by discrimination, mental distress or loss of employment); Jones v. Los Angeles
Community College Dist., 244 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act did not preclude painter
from recovering for injuries arising from racial discrimination in employment);
Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1985) (finding
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Even courts that adopt new ways around the exclusivity rule
rarely acknowledge that the balance between employer and employee
rights is out of kilter. Two factors that underlie the increased number
of challenges to the system, however, suggest that the bargain between
employees and employers needs adjustment. 12I
First, the tension between the tort and workers' compensation
systems is becoming increasingly obvious. 122 When originally enacted,
workers' compensation statutes benefitted workers because the tort
system, with its inherent difficulty of establishing the employer's
fault, had left many workplace injuries uncompensated.123 It is now
significantly easier for plaintiffs to prevail under the tort system and
to receive substantial jury verdicts for pain and suffering, and,
sometimes, punitive damages. Plaintiffs are better able to prove their
tort claims because of the weakening of some common law defenses,124 particularly the increasing acceptance of comparative rather
than contributory negligence,125 and because of the development of
the strict liability concept. 126
The tension between the tort and workers' compensation systems
has been exacerbated not only because employees would, if given the
option, frequently be able to recover under the common law, but
also because employees would receive a substantially greater monetary
reward under the tort system than under the workers' compensation
system. Some states have raised their workers' compensation benefit
levels,127 but even these increases have failed to keep pace with the
rising cost of living,l28 so that workers are rarely compensated to the
full extent of their loss.129

12l.

122.
123.
124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.

exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation statutes does not ban
employment discrimination claims); Reese v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 731 P.2d
497 (Wash. 1987) (determining that the exclusive remedy principle does not
preclude handicap discrimination claims).
See generally Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1648 (positing that workers compensation system is inadequate both as a means of providing adequate relief
to injured workers and as a mechanism for creating proper incentives for
reduction of accidents and related costs).
See Dittoe, supra note 13, at 1208-10; Page, supra note 50, at 556-57;
Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1660-6l.
See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1645.
Maryland is one of the few states that still has contributory rather than
comparative negligence as a defense. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 471 n.30 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1988).
See Snell, supra note 5, at 455.
See Thompson, supra note 117, at 22.
Id.
Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1642.
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The workers' compensation system is limited to medical and
rehabilitation costs, and, usually, two-thirds of the workers' average
weekly wage. 130 Furthermore, the prohibition of punitive damages
and awards for pain and suffering under the workers' compensation
system creates a disparity whereby a worker eligible for only a small
recovery under the system could recover substantially more under
the common law had the injury not occurred during the course of
employment.
When comparing the two alternatives, it is also important to
note that those employed in industries that still enjoy the protection
of unions, and those who live in states that have adopted exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine (thereby making it less likely that
they could be fired for suing their employer), can be more assertive
in pursuing common law remedies.13I Also, more attorneys are available to help employees assert their rights. 132 Finally, some commentators focus on administrative flaws in the workers' compensation
system that prevent the speedy payments that were meant to offset
the larger awards possible under the common law. 133
The second major reason to reconsider the bargain between
employer and employee rights is that in some cases employees' safety
needs are not satisfied. Workers' compensation statutes were originally designed to promote safety, 134 increasing the level of workplace
safety by placing the cost of workplace accidents on employers who
pay insurance premiums. 13s Employers desiring to lessen their premiums thus had an incentive to maintain a safe workplace. 136
Unfortunately, however, the system fails to impose the full cost
of work-related accidents on employers. 137 Employees therefore suffer
130. [d.
131. [d. at 1645. For a discussion of the employment-at-will rule and the public
policy exception in Maryland, see Gil A. Abramson & Stephen M. Silvestri,
Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge in Maryland, 10 U.
BALT. L. REv. 257, 259 (1981).
.
132. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1645. Some commentators believe the increase in
the number of attorneys over the past seventy years hurts the process of
compensating employees. See, e.g., King, supra note 16, at 411.
133. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1644 (citing POLICY GROUP OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: Is
THERE A BETTER WAY? 19 (1977) (positing that problems of workers' compensation are "due as much to the structure and management of the system as
they are to the adequacy of benefits"».
134. See id. at 1641.
135. See id. at 1646.
136. See generally Thompson, supra note 117.
137. See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1646. The author explains that "[a]ttaining
the socially optimal level of workplace safety requires that the amount of
spending on safety measures be set so that it minimizes total accident cost."
Furthermore, "[e]mployers are the appropriate party to bear accident costs,
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in a two-fold manner that is antithetical to the original bargain: first
they are not compensated fully under the workers' compensation
system; second they often enjoy a less than safe work environment.
As long as benefit levels remain low and the exclusive remedy rule
remains intact, employers have inadequate incentives to increase the
safety of working conditions. Additionally, recent budget cutbacks 138
and policy changes 139 at state l40 and federaP41 regulatory agencies have
increasingly left these agencies unable to effectively ensure a safe
workplace. These two factors have led many courts, and some state
legislatures, to consider renegotiating the bargain between employers
and employees by revising exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule.

B. Recent Judicially Created Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy
Provision
Courts in several jurisdictions have recently accepted new arguments to avoid the exclusive remedy rule. For instance, new interpretations of Maryland's exclusivity provision and intentional tort
exception recently emerged in Federated Department Stores v. Le. 142
This section first details the court of special appeals opinion in Le,
then examines the new interpretation of the intent exception adopted
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the subsequent appeal.
Finally, a judicially created exception to the exclusive remedy provision that has been adopted by jurisdictions outside of Maryland is
considered.
1.

Classifying Torts: Le v. Federated Department Stores

In Le v. Federated Department Stores,143 Thach Le, a department
store salesperson, sued Federated, the corporate parent of his employer, Bloomingdale's, for false arrest, defamation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. l44 Bloomingdale's regional chief of
security, Suzanne Spahr, had accused him of stealing a ca1culator. 145
Le's complaint alleged that he was wrongly detained in the security

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.

because they have greater control over workplace hazards than
are generally better able to take preventive measures." [d.
See Metz, supra note 8, at 15.
[d. at 14-15.
Maryland monitors occupational safety at the state level. See
IN MARYLAND, supra note 9, at 1.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
1990).
324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991), aff'g 80 Md. App. 89, 560
80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989).
[d. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42.
[d.

do workers and

WORK INJURIES

administers the
(1988 & Supp.
A.2d 42 (1989).
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office, that he was coerced to sign a statement confessing to the
theft, and that he was led through the store crying. l46
Federated filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision
precluded Le from suing Bloomingdale's for tortious acts committed
by the security officer, a fellow employee. 147 Federated asserted that
Le could sue at common law only if Spahr was the "alter ego" of
Federated. 148 Le contended in response that the security officer was
Bloomingdale's "alter ego" at the time of the incident, and that the
employee's intentional acts could therefore be attributed to the employer, allowing Le the option of a common law suit. 149
The circuit court, relying on the holdings in Schatz v. York
Steak House Systems, Inc. ISO and Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, lSI ruled against Le on the motion for summary judgment,
finding the alter ego theory inapplicable to Le's case. IS2 Le appealed
this decision to the court of special appeals, which found that Mr.
Le had sustained a nonphysical tortious injury. The court held that
such nonphysical, psychological injuries fell outside the scope of the
Act's exclusivity provision, thereby permitting a civil tort action.153
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the court of special
appeals distinguished Schatz and Mirabile by explaining that in those
cases the claimants had suffered both psychological and physical
injuries. ls4 The Workers' Compensation Act provides a remedy in
such cases for the disability or death of an employee resulting from
an accidental personal injury. 155 Le, however, had not alleged that
he suffered a disability resulting from an accidental personal injury. 156
Rather, he sued on the grounds of false arrest, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. ls7 Thus, the Act did not
bar Le's recovery for the intentional torts he alleged.
The court of special appeals relied on Larson's workers' compensation treatise, which asserts that if the "essence of the tort . . .
is non-physical ... with physical injury being at most added to the
list of injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred."ls8
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 92, 560 A.2d at 43.
Id.
See Federated, 324 Md. at 76, 595 A.2d at 1069.
Id. at 77, 595 A.2d at 1069-70.
See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
Federated, 80 Md. App. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42.
Id. at 92-93, 560 A.2d at 43-44.
Id. at 90-91, 560 A.2d at 42.
Id. at 91, 560 A.2d at 43.
!d.
Id. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42.
Id. at 92, 560 A.2d at 43 (quoting 2A A. LARSON, THE
COMPENSATION, § 68.34(a) (1976».
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The court of special appeals thus effectively adopted Larson's view
that intentional torts that do not entail a physical injury component
do not invoke the Workers' Compensation Act. Because the Act thus
provides no remedy, an employee would be permitted to bring a civil
tort suit to obtain a remedy. 159
The rationale adopted by Maryland's intermediate appellate court
in Federated briefly added Marylimd to a list of states adopting
schemes whereby courts granted exceptions to the exclusive remedy
rule by classifying torts.16O This is but one of three means by which
courts have avoided the exclusive remedy rule. The two other methods
involve redefining the meaning of intent,161 and focusing on whether
the nature of the employee's injury is of the kind that the workers'
compensation system was intended to remedy. 162
Two years after the court of special appeals ruling in Federated,
the decision, although supported by a different rationale, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Federated Department
Store v. Le. 163 The court of appeals rejected a rule that classified
torts in favor of a new interpretation of Maryland's intentional tort
exception.
2. Modifying the Intent Exception: Federated Department Stores
v. Le
Rejecting as too narrow the alter ego doctrine developed in
Schatz v. York Steak House Systems, Inc. 164 and Continental Casualty
v. Mirabile,165 the court of appeals in Federated Department Stores

159. [d. at 92-93, 560 A.2d at 43-44.
160. See, e.g., Moore v. Federated Dep't Stores, 190 N.W.2d 262 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971) (allowing suit under common law by employee falsely accused and
imprisoned by her employer for failing to ring up a sale); Mason v. District
of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1978) (allowing suit under common law by
employee suing a police officer for mental suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, and anguish); Skelton v. W.T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1964)
(finding false arrest claimant's action not barred); Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444
So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1984) (finding claim of false imprisonment by co-employees
not barred from civil suit); Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270
(Ky. 1981) (finding claim for slander and false imprisonment by co-employee
not barred from civil court). Cj. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729
P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987) (finding that while suit at common law by employee who
suffered a stroke resulting in paralysis was barred because physical injuries
were alleged, the exclusivity rule would not have barred a common law suit if
complaint had alleged only mental suffering or emotional distress).
161. See infra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 187-199 and accompanying text.
163. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991).
164. See supra notes 84-192 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
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v. Le166 shed new light on the relationship between the Workers'
Compensation Act's exclusivity provision 167 and the intentional tort
exception. 168 Guided by the established principles governing the interpretation of Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act,169 the court
held that when an employee suffers an injury resulting from a
deliberate attempt to injure him, the intentional tort exception authorizes a suit against the employer at common law as though the
workers' compensation statute did not exist. l7O To hold an employer
liable for an employee's intentional acts committed within the scope
of employment, tort principles would demand neither that the offending employee be the employer's "alter ego," nor that the employee's acts be "expressly authorized."171
In rejecting the alter ego analysis, the court stated that it would
not restrict the coverage of the intentional tort exception by inserting
limiting conditions not set forth by the legislature. 172 Furthermore,
the court noted that in adopting the alter ego doctrine, the court of
special appeals had relied on cases from states whose workers'
compensation statutes lacked intentional tort exceptions comparable
to Maryland's.173 Courts in those states have thus had to adopt
limited judicial exceptions to their exclusive remedy provisions to
allow employees access to the civil tort system. 174
The court found that Maryland need not rely on judicially
created exceptions such as the alter ego doctrine because Maryland's
statutory exclusive remedy provision can be interpreted as allowing
for the very same exception. 17s Construing the intentional tort excep-

166. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991).
167. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(a) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE
art. 101, § 15 (1985»).
168. Id. § 9-509(d) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44 (1985»).
169. Federated, 324 Md. at 80-81, 595 A.2d at 1071-72. The principles are set as
follows:
First the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words of the
Act must be ascertained and given effect; secondly, 'the language of
a statute is its most natural expositor, and where the language is
susceptible of sensible interpretation, it is not to be controlled by any
extraneous considerations' (Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471);
thirdly, the construction must be liberal in favor of a private right,
and construction which imputes an intention to deny valuable rights
should be avoided; fourthly, statutes are presumed to be passed in
full recognition of the constitutional rights of the citizen.
/d. (citing Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 575, 96 A. 764, 765 (1916».
170. Id. at 85-86, 595 A.2d at 1074.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 85, 595 A.2d at 1074.
173. Id. at 82, 595 A.2d at 1072.
174. Id. at 82-83, 595 A.2d at 1072-73.
175. Id. at 83, 595 A.2d at 1073.
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tion as providing nothing more than is already embodied in the
exclusive remedy provision would thus render it superfluous. 176
The court also dismissed the notion that Maryland's intentional
tort exception might represent a legislative enactment equivalent to
other states' judicially created exceptions. 177 The court found that
this could not be the case because the judicially created exceptions
address injuries deemed to fall outside the scope of an exclusive
remedy provision, while Maryland's intentional tort exception "is
only applicable to injuries encompassed by [the exclusive remedy
provision]."178 Because Maryland's intentional tort exception grants
employees the option of accepting workers' compensation benefits
or of pursuing a common law suit, the court concluded that "it
makes little sense to equate [the intentional tort exception] with a
judicially-created exception to compensation coverage." 179
. This new ruling grants plaintiffs such as Le the option to pursue
common law tort remedies, which are capable of generating recoveries
substantially more lucrative than workers' compensation recovery.
Under common law principles, it could be argued that Spahr, the
security officer, deliberately intended to injure Le and that Spahr's
employer would therefore be liable under vicarious liability standards
set forth in Cox v. Prince George's County.180 Employees in Le's
position need no longer engage in an alter ego analysis in order to
hold their employers vicariously liable.
3.

Modifying the Definition of Intent

Thus, one way to modify the intentional tort exception to the
exclusivity provision is to make it less narrow by rejecting the alter
ego analyses courts have used in the past. Other states have taken
the approach of broadening the definition of "intent." This Article
has already reviewed cases in which courts have determined that
"intent" includes willful, wanton or grossly reckless employer behavior, in addition to specific intent to cause harm. lSI
Some commentators have encouraged a different interpretation
of "intent." One line of reasoning urges that the intent concept
should mirror the definition set forth in the Restatement (Second)
oj Torts. 182 The Restatement defines intent as the desire to bring
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 83-84, 595 A.2d at 1073.
Id. at 83, 595 A.2d at 1073 (emphasis added).
Id. at 84, 595 A.2d at 1073.
Id. at 81, 595 A.2d at 1072 (citing Cox v. Prince George's County, 296 Md.
162, 170-71, 460 A.2d 1038, 1042-43 (1983».
181. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Kawaler, supra note 43, at 204, wherein the author advocates that
legislatures adopt a model statute that includes this definition.
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about the harm or knowledge to a substantial certainty that the harm
would occur. 183 Most commentators advocating this approach believe
that a claimant in this circumstance should be allowed to receive
benefits under the workers' compensation statute and pursue a common law cause of action,l84 thus eliminating concerns about inconsistent pleadings. 18s Additionally, double recovery would not be a
problem because an employer could be allowed a set-off should the
plaintiff receive a workers' compensation award. 186
4. Another Approach: Focusing on the Nature of the Employee's
. Injury
Some courts focus on the nature of an employee's injury, making
exceptions for injuries not contemplated by the workers' compensation statute. 18? Employees suffering injuries for which the statute fails
to provide a remedy may pursue a common law remedy.188 This
inquiry differs from the rationale presented by the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland in Le v. Federated Department Stores. 189 Under
this approach, the tort itself may be physical or nonphysical; it is
the result of the injury that may not be compensable. Thus it is not
surprising that the two approaches sometimes overlap.
The logic of such overlap is questioned in assertions such as the
following:
When one thinks of workmen's compensation, what comes
to mind is traumatic injury, occupational disease and similar
physical harms associated with the employment. It is difficult to imagine, however, what workmen's compensation
183.
184.
185.
186.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
See, e.g., Kawaler, supra note 43, at 204, 206.
[d. at 207.
Professor Larson suggests a "two fund" recovery system when separate and
distinct kinds of injury are present. When an employee is injured by a dangerous
condition in the workplace and the employee continues to work in the same
condition and sustains further injuries, this "two fund" system should apply.
The first fund would be governed by workers' compensation and would cover
the first injury. Tort law would govern the second fund, covering injuries
sustained after the employer gained knowledge of the first injury and its cause.
Massey, supra note 104, at 358; see also 2A LARSON, supra note 38, at §§
59.30 - 59.34; MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 227-42 (discussing
Maryland's subsequent injury fund).
187. See, e.g., Russell v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 666 F.2d 1188 (8th Cir. 1981)
(rape); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 456 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (sex and age discrimination).
188. See, e.g., Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1978)
(holding employee's action for intentional infliction of emotional distress not
barred by workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision).
189. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
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can have in common with such essentially non-physical torts
as deceit, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 190
The overlap occurs because these injuries that stem from nonphysical
torts are just some of the types of injuries that legislators probably
never envisioned when they enacted workers' compensation statutes.
Courts have recognized other injuries that legislators failed to consider when codifying the initial bargain between the employers and
employees.
An injury stemming from on-the-job sexual assault is an example
of the sort of harm never contemplated by legislators. 191 Many states
cover this injury under their workers' compensation statutes, barring
civil actions for such injuries as intentional infliction of emotional
distress by their exclusivity provision. l92
Similar results occur with regard to injuries that cause sexual
impairment. 193 Many states do not award permanent disability benefits
to employees who receive injuries arising out of and in the course
of employment that render employees impotent or sterile. 194 Workers
in this situation cannot pursue common law remedies. 195 Even an
employee incurring a gross facial disfigurement, but whose earning
capacity was not affected, would be similarly situated. Surely, when
they negotiated their original bargain, employees did not contemplate
that these kinds of injuries would remain uncompensated. Some
courts are sympathetic to these claims, creating exceptions to the
exclusivity rule for them. l96
Finally, courts have determined that the physical injury that
results from emotional distress due to an employer's sex discrimination should not be brought under workers' compensation. 197 A few
courts have classified this injury under workers' compensation by
accepting employer's arguments that any cause of action in which
injuries are compensable through workers' compensation should be
barred from civil litigation due to the exclusivity provision. 198 Most

190. Arthur Larson, Nonphysical Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.
L. REv. 1, 1 (1975).
191. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Holland v. Norristown State Hosp., 584 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1991); Jesse v. Savings Prods., 772 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. 1989).
193. See generally Dittoe, supra note 13.
194. [d. at 1207, 1215-16.
195. [d.
196. See, e.g., Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474,
50 A.2d 799 (1947); see also Dittoe, supra note 13, at 1223 (citing several
California cases).
197. See supra note 120.
198. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
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courts, however, believe that this interpretation of the exclusivity
principle distorts the original purposes of workers' compensation. l99
Employees probably never imagined that they were giving up their
right to state discrimination claims when workers' compensation
legislation was originally negotiated.
C. Recent Legis/ative Action Regarding the Workers'
Compensation System
Absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent, courts are
hesitant to encroach upon the historic expansive reading of the
exclusivity provision. 200 In instances when courts have done so, legislators have sometimes stepped in and changed what courts have
done to modify the employer-employee bargain.201 Therefore, it becomes important to look at what legislators can do regarding this
issue.202 Among other actions, the Maryland legislature could consider
the following two options that other states have addressed or are
currently considering.
Increasing Awards to Employees in Specific Cases
Some states require employers to pay additional compensation
to employees in certain circumstances, such as when an employer is
grossly negligent, or fails to reveal unsafe working circumstances to
an employee.203 California's labor code, for example, provides that
an employee injured by the serious and willful misconduct of his
employer may have his compensation award increased by fifty percent, up to a maximum of $10,000. 204 Furthermore, employers are
not permitted to insure against having to pay this additional compensation. 20s This statutory provision is a compromise between Maryland's current scheme, which allows employers to engage in this
behavior with no real consequence,206 and what some other jurisdic1.

199. See, e.g., Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (discussing exclusivity principle in the context of damages sought for
race discrimination).
200. Dittoe, supra note 13, at 1231. One commentator has indicated that legislatures
rather than courts should resolve public policy issues so that public testimony
and debate can occur. BaHam, supra note 6, at 120. Legislators, however, are
slow to act, and are subject to the pressures of interest groups, especially in
states in which there is a fear that changes in the law could drive employers
out of the state. See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1657.
201. See supra note 72; Kawaler, supra note 43, at 182.
202. The legislature could take action on any of the issues presented in the preceding
section. For example, the legislature could change the meaning of "intent."
203. See supra note 39.
204. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989).
205. [d.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
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tions have done, which is to allow the employee to pursue civil
remedies instead of workers' compensation. 207
2. Replacing the Workers' Compensation System with an
Integrated System
California recently passed legislation modifying its state's workers' compensation system. 208 This legislation followed an earlier radical proposal that would have provided benefits to employees regardless
of whether the condition or injury occurred on the job. 209 That
proposal would have eliminated problems with exclusivity because all
injuries and illnesses would be handled by the same system.
Although California ultimately abandoned its fundamental compensation reform, making only modest improvements to its system,21O
its ideas on workers' compensation reform merit attention. After
California passed its recent legislation, the California Senate Committee on Industrial Relations issued a report titled Healthy Worker
- Healthy Workpiace,iJl in which it considered issues relevant to
future reform legislation.
The primary feature of reform articulated by the Senate Committee on Industrial Relations in Healthy Worker is the merger of
California's workers' compensation, state disability, and group health
care insurance into one mandatory health care insurance program
and one mandatory disability and occupational rehabilitation program. 212 This program would compensate all the disabilities or injuries
affecting an employee's ability to work.213 Thus, it would not matter
whether an employee was actually injured at work.
The purpose of this proposed system would be to improve care
for sick and injured workers by eliminating overlapping programs
and streamlining administration,214 ending what legislators believe to
be an excess of state time and money spent on efforts to tie disability
to work and to determine the extent of work-related disabilities. 215
207. See supra note 72.
208. See Harry Bernstein, How a Good Workers' Compensation Reform Plan
Unraveled, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1989, at Sec. IV, p. 1.
209. California's Radical Proposal, NATION'S Bus., Mar. 1990, at 22.
210. See Bernstein, supra note 208, at D1.
211. SENATE COMM. ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, HEALTHY
WORKER - HEALTHY WORKPLACE: THE PRODUCTIVITY CONNECTION (1990) [hereinafter HEALTHY WORKER].

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 40-41.
California'S Radical Proposal, supra note 209, at 22.
Id.
Id. The report states that "[s]ince lifestyles, pre-existing diseases, and related
disabilities are burdening the workers' compensation system, the remedy is to
create a truly no-fault insurance system for ail disabilities which occur in the
laborforce and which temporarily or permanently impair the ability to stay on
the job." HEALTHY WORKER, supra note 211, at 41; see also California'S
Radical Proposal, supra note 209, at 22.
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The insurance program supporting this system would be funded
through progressive taxation based upon income, while the' cost of
the premium would be divided between the employer and employees
at a percentage determined by the state. 216 Recall that under workers'
compensation systems employers are typically fully financially responsible.
The law California actually passed is much less dramatic than
those recommendations articulated in Healthy Worker. The law's
most significant change is that it nearly doubled the maximum weekly
benefits paid to employees over a two-year time span.217 The law
also increased the maximum vocational rehabilitation benefits, increased counseling services, and included provisions that encourage
employers to make speedy payments. 218 The legislation also benefits
employers. Insurance companies, for example, have agreed to reduce
employer rates. The law also discourages "doctor shopping" by
limiting employee options regarding choice of doctors.219 In sum,
although California's new law eschewed radical change,220 the ideas
216. California's Radical Proposal, supra note 209, at 22.
217. Douglas P. Shuit, Governor Tells Plan to Revamp Workers' Comp., L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1989, at Sec. I, p. 1.
218. [d.
219. Daniel M. Weintraub, Negotiators Reach Common Ground on Workers' Comp.,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1989, at Sec. I, p. 1.
220. In his 1993 State of the State Address, California Governor Pete Wilson called
for workers' compensation reform. Governor Wilson said:
We moved closer last year but failed to reform a corrupt, costly
and terribly unfair system of workers' compensation. People like Mike
Stennis [a business owner whose restaurants were vandalized during
the L.A. riots) will tell you that he can survive the L.A. riots, but
that California's fraud-ridden system of workers' compensation may
do him in, along with all the workers who depend on him. Let's
reform this corrupt system. Let's get the job done.
On New Year's Day, Gayle and I were invited by friends to join
a family gathering. Their son-in-law, Fred Silva, is a superb craftsmen
who owns a business that puts down wood flooring.
After three years as a small employer, Fred has decided to call
it quits. Though he's never had a claim filed against him, his workers'
compensation costs have become unaffordable. He'll still take jobs
he can do by himself. But he just can't afford to be an employer any
longer. He just can't make it.
Fred's wife, Donna, told me: "It's just not fair to our employees," putting into words the pain on her husband's face.
She's right. It makes no sense that workers' comp-a system
intended to protect injured workers and their families-is today hurting
more workers than it helps. It's stealing from them. It's stealing their
jobs-jobs we all need both to put food on the table, and to take
pride and dignity from doing something that has value each day.
It's just not fair.
Last year, the Council on California Competitiveness accused
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presented in Healthy Worker are important for states that are considering effecting more systemic changes in their workers' compensation programs.
IV. RENEGOTIATING THE BARGAIN: AN EVALUATION
OF THE ALTERNATIVES
Maryland has several options for revising its present workers'
. compensation scheme. This section evaluates the judicially created
exceptions - classifying torts, modifying the intent exception, and
focusing on the nature of the employee's injury - and possible
legislative changes - increasing awards to employees in specific cases
and replacing the workers' compensation with a brand new system.
This section assumes that the bargain between employers and employees must change to promote workplace safety, but also that the
renegotiation must not be too drastic in light of the legislature's
reluctance to impose additional costs on Maryland businesses.

A.

Classifying Torts

Distinguishing between physical and nonphysical injuries would
provide employees greater access to the civil court system. Employees
who select a civil action and choose unsophisticated attorneys, however, may find themselves victims of improperly drafted pleadings.
An attorney whose client had suffered a nonphysical injury might
add a physical injury count to bolster the employee's claim and, as
a result, unknowingly place the claim squarely within the ambit of
the workers' compensation system. Conversely, a claimant might feel
compelled to disregard physical injuries and focus instead on more
temporary or intangible injuries, such as those resulting from false
imprisonment, in order to avoid falling under the workers' compensation system.
A great dilemma arises in the case of an employee who is raped.
Such an incident gives rise to claims of false imprisonment and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. An employee arguing that
the injury is primarily nonphysical is likely to face an employer who
will argue that the physical aspect of rape cannot be glossed over in
order to engage in a civil action. Additionally, as the workers'
compensation system starts to address more fully the issue of comstate and local governments of becoming a "job-killing-machine."
John Vasconcellos, you and your ADEPT report reached the same
conclusions. Those of you on both sides of the aisle seem to agree
on the urgent need for a cure. What remains is for us to take action
and to get the job done.
Text 0/ Governor's Address, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1993, at A20.
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pensating employees for mental or psychological injuries, the rationale behind classifying torts erodes. Maryland's highest court was thus
wise to create a different approach to avoid the exclusivity provision
in Federated Department Stores v. Le. 221

B.

Modifying the Intentional Tort Exception
Maryland's decision to broaden an employee's option to choose
a common law action by rejecting the alter ego theory will allow
plaintiffs a chance to procure a more appropriate remedy through
civil actions. The court of appeals decision in Federated Department
Stores v. Le will provide a more just result for plaintiffs like those
in Federated,222 Schatz,2'];3 and Mirabile. 224 In the future, the court
should modify the intent exception to refrain from shielding employers who are grossly negligent and who fail to promote safe working
conditions. Employers presently have few incentives to promote safety.
Regulatory supervision and unionism have declined, leaving fewer
workplace watchdogs. The uncaring employer is able to simply write
off the increased workers' compensation insurance premiums that
result from unsafe working conditions as a cost of doing business.
This alternative for renegotiating the bargain is very promising.
Maryland courts have already demonstrated a willingness to pursue
this alternative. Courts in the future should enhance the rule-based
analysis outlined in Federated by adding policy-based arguments that
explicitly acknowledge the need to rebalance employer and employee
rights.
Focusing on the Nature oj the Employee's Injury
This exception to the exclusive remedy principle makes sense on
one level quite simply because it seems inherently unfair for employees
to assume the risk of injuries like sexual assault or impotence as part
of the quid pro quo with the employer. This exception is problematic,
however, because it is difficult to draw the line between what will
be considered a "normal" and "abnormal" consequence of working.
The courts or the legislature could create more certainty for employers
and employees alike, yet still achieve the same result, by keeping
what makes sense in the workers' compensation system and by
modifying the remaining sections.
C.

D.

Increasing A wards to Employees in Specific Cases
The alternative of increasing awards to employees in specific
kinds of cases holds promise. Its primary strength is that it gives

221.
222.
223.
224.

See supra notes 166-180 and accompanying text.
[d.
See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
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employees additional compensation in circumstances in which the
employer's behavior was especially reprehensible. Allowing increased
awards would provide an incentive to employers to behave in ways
that would prevent them from incurring such additional expense.
Employers would be more reluctant to engage in intentional or grossly
negligent acts, resulting in increased workplace safety.
This alternative benefits employers because it reduces employees'
eagerness to pursue common law remedies. Additionally, employers
benefit from the certainty of knowing the economic consequences of
certain types of conduct in advance, rather than gambling on jury
verdicts in civil cases. This alternative seems more practical than the
present scheme in light of the realities of the business world and, as
such, deserves serious consideration.

E. Replacing the Workers' Compensation System with an
Integrated System
The ideas presented in Healthy Worker - Healthy Workplace
are also worth considering. Despite the unlikelihood that Maryland's
workers' compensation system will undergo radical reform, California's ideas are relevant in light of Maryland's willingness to narrow
the exclusivity rule, as evidenced by Federated Department Stores v.
Le.
An integrated workers' compensation system providing benefits
to employees regardless of whether they were injured at work would
reduce litigation and benefit a greater number of injured citizens.
Depending upon the benefit levels in this kind of plan, this alternative
could protect employees by providing incentives to promote workplace safety. Under an integrated system, employers could also benefit. As California's suggestions indicate, employers could benefit by
paying reduced insurance premiums and less in attorneys' fees since
employees would no longer need to litigate to avoid a flawed system.

v.

CONCLUSION

The exclusivity provision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act has been·a blessing to employers by limiting their economic
liability. Maryland employees in search of safety in the workplace
are, however, understandably discouraged. when they see the disincentives the Maryland workers' compensation law provides to employers. Employers have the luxury of knowing that employees will
receive low benefits from workplace injuries, and that only on rare
occasions will the employee succeed in a common law tort suit.
The court of appeals implicitly acknowledged the need for a
change through their holding in Federated Department Stores v. Le.
The bargain upon which workers' compensation laws are based is
out of step with the realities of today's marketplace. Maryland's
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highest court moved in a positive direction when it questioned past
Maryland cases that had unfairly burdened employees. By reinterpreting the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision, the
court has moved to adjust the balance between employee and employer rights. For plaintiffs like Thach Le, the new ruling enhances
the ability to sue under common law principles. For many other
employees, the courts or the legislature must go further to adjust the
balance. This Article has outlined several alternatives for change.
Regardless of which alternative is ultimately selected, debate on the
issue promises to be intense.

